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SINCE 1979,  union contract concessions have occurred  with increasing 
frequency.  Substantial  press attention  has been devoted  to these conces- 
sions along  with other  ills plaguing  organized  labor  such as the declining 
proportion  of union  members  in the work  force and political  difficulties 
with the Reagan  administration.  Popular  accounts of these trends  often 
suggest that a turning  point in union wage determination  and industrial 
relations  has been reached. 
It is clear that the current  climate for large wage settlements, both 
union and nonunion,  is unfavorable.  The general  economic slack since 
1979  and the deceleration  of price inflation  that began in 1981 suggest 
that  the rate of wage increase in the near  future  should  be lower than  in 
the recent past. Such behavior  by itself does not represent  a break  from 
past processes of setting wages; empirical  wage equations have long 
suggested  that recession and declining  price inflation  would have such 
an effect. 
Although  the concessions have been confined  thus far to distressed 
industries,  it might be hypothesized that they would have "spillover" 
effects on wages elsewhere. Such spillovers could produce short-term 
wage settlements below what standard  wage equations  would predict. 
Or  it might  even be argued  that  recent  concessions will  prove  to represent 
fundamental  changes in wage-determination  processes for the longer 
run,  particularly  changes  that  would  make  wage inflation  more sensitive 
to real  business cycle conditions. 
In this paper  I address  three questions. First, is the current  episode 
of union  wage concessions unprecedented?  The answer  turns  out to be 
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Table 1.  Wage Increases and Unionization, 1953-76a 
Percent 
Industries  with  Industries  with 
above-aver-age  below-average 
Per-iod  unionization  ratesb  unionization  ratesb 
1953-58  4.4  3.9 
1958-64  3.3  3.2 
1964-68  4.4  4.6 
1968-71  6.6  6.1 
1971-73  7.8  6.1 
1973-76  9.0  8.0 
1953-76  5.3  4.8 
Source:  Daniel J. B.  Mitchell,  Unzionis,  Wages,  and Inflatiot  (Brookings  Institution,  1980), p. 40. 
a.  Wage increase  is annual change  in average  hourly earnings. 
b.  Unionization  rates are based on the contract  file of the  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
negative.  Similar episodes  have occurred in the past, and these experi- 
ences  suggest that permanent and fundamental changes in wage-deter- 
mination processes  are unlikely  to  occur  in the  absence  of  external 
intervention. Second, could the government intervene during the current 
concession  episode  to make useful  reforms in wage-setting  processes 
that would  increase  the  responsiveness  of  wage  adjustments  to  the 
business cycle? It is suggested that the adoption of "gain sharing" plans 
(such  as  profit  sharing)  in  some  current  concession  situations  is  a 
tendency  that the government  might encourage.  Third, could possible 
spillovers from the current union concessions  lead to widespread mod- 
eration in wage change throughout the economy?  Traditional channels 
of wage  imitation  are outlined  in an effort to answer  this.  However, 
preliminary  evidence  suggests  that  spillover  outside  the  traditional 
channels had not occurred as of early 1982. 
Long-Run  Influences  on Union  Contract  Concessions 
Tables 1 and 2 report the effects of unionization on wage trends since 
the mid-1950s. Until the mid-1970s, the U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics 
did not provide separate data on union and nonunion wages. Hence table 
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Table 2.  Wage Increases  and  Unionization,  1976-81a 
Percent 
Union  Nonunion 
Year  sectoor  sector' 
1976  8.1  6.8 
1977  7.6  6.6 
1978  8.0  7.6 
1979  9.0  8.5 
1980  10.9  8.0 
1981  9.6  8.5 
Source:  Cuirrenit  Wage Developnmenits,  various issues. 
a.  Wage increase is annual change  in the employment  cost  index.  Data are on a December  to December  basis. 
and below-average  unionization  rates to estimate  differences  between 
union and nonunion wage increases.  The wage differential widened from 
the end of the Korean War until the mid-1970s. For the 1976-81 period, 
direct data on union and nonunion wage trends are available and appear 
in table 2. These show a continued widening of the union-nonunion wage 
gap. 
The expanding union-nonunion wage differential could help explain 
a number of  phenomena  affecting  unions.  These  include  the  relative 
shrinkage in the size of the union sector and the increasing hostility  to 
new organization on the part of management about which unions have 
complained in recent years. From the perspective of wage determination, 
however,  the widening gap may have created economic forces requiring 
readjustments of the wage  structure. Where the union wage premium 
has widened, competitive pressures from the nonunion or foreign sectors 
have presumably grown. Such pressures originating in product markets 
will eventually  reduce job  opportunities  for union workers and create 
pressures for wage concessions. 
Short-Run  Developments 
Wage equations  suggest  that a widening  union-nonunion  wage  gap 
would have a modest  impact on wage  inflation. My earlier Brookings 
study indicates  that the widening of the gap reflected in table 2 would 
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change  by 1982.1  However, such an effect has not been widespread.  The 
union  sector appears  to have become segmented,  with dramatic  conces- 
sions occurring  in some industries  while other wage settlements seem 
largely  unaffected. 
Whether a given contract settlement is a concession is obviously 
subjective.  It might  be argued  that  a union  that  negotiates  a wage  increase 
of 7 percent  when 10  percent  has been expected has made  a concession. 
The difficulty  of estimating  an expected wage adjustment  for individual 
settlements, however, precludes the use of such a broad definition  of 
concession for analytical  purposes. Instead, a narrowly  defined  list of 
concessions was drawn  for the period beginning  in 1979  and ending in 
early 1982  from  published  sources such  as Current  Wage  Developments. 
Concessions were defined as including wage cuts, wage freezes, 
premature  renegotiations  of existing contracts (the termination  of an 
existing  agreement  before  the official  expiration  date  and  its replacement 
with  a new contract  providing  less favorable  terms  to workers),  an  easing 
of work-rule  restrictions  in a manner  likely to decrease employer  costs, 
and  a miscellaneous  category  of other  notable  breaks  from  past  practice  . 
Forty-six such situations were identified.2  Of these, twenty-one were 
wage cuts and thirteen  were wage freezes. In eleven cases, work rules 
were relaxed.  At least twenty-six  of the concessions involved  premature 
renegotiations  of unexpired  contracts.  The  industries  covered  by conces- 
sions included  newspapers  and printing,  supermarkets,  railroads,  tires 
and rubber, automobiles, automotive parts, steel, trucking, airlines, 
farm  machinery,  construction,  meat packing, ship building,  and paper 
manufacturing.  Although a precise count of the number of workers 
covered by the concessions is not possible, the number  would certainly 
1. In a previous  Brookings  study I included  a relative  wage variable  in wage-change 
equations  for various  union  contracts.  The variable  was defined  as the ratio  of the wage in 
the industry  to the average  wage in the private,  nonfarm  economy. The coefficient  was 
invariably  negative,  suggesting  that  wages that  rise relative  to the average  tend  to exhibit 
slower  future  wage growth.  The union wage figures  of table 2 suggest  a widening  of the 
ratio  of about  4.3 percent  from December 1975  to December  1981.  Multiplying  0.043 by 
the REL  coefficients  (relative  earnings  status  of the industry  before  the effective date of 
the contract)  in equations  3 and  4 of table  4-7  in Daniel  J. B. Mitchell,  Unions, Wages,  and 
Inflation  (Brookings  Institution,  1980),  produces  the results  described  in the text. See also 
Mitchell,  "Union  Wage  Determination:  Policy  Implications  and  Outlook,"  BPEA,  1978:3, 
p. 556. 
2. A list will be provided  by the author  on request. Daniel J.  B. Mitchell  169 
be less than two million, with the largest  groups  in the automobile  and 
intercity  trucking  industries. 
It was  clear from the descriptions of  the forty-six instances of 
concessions that imminent  closing of plants, layoffs, and bankruptcies 
motivated  the agreements.  In some cases, when  management's  demands 
for concessions were rejected, steps were taken  to cut back production 
and employment. These steps sometimes produced worker acquies- 
cence. In a number  of instances, the wage concessions were "sweet- 
ened" by implementation  of a profit-sharing  plan whereby workers 
would gain if the economic health of the employer was eventually 
restored.  Instances  of worker  ownership  or partial  ownership  were also 
reported.  In some cases, wage increases  were suspended  or a portion  of 
current  wages was "put aside." This may have been intended by the 
union to indicate that the wage rates were merely in some ill-defined 
limbo  from  which  they would  emerge  in better  times. Several  settlements 
provided  explicit guarantees  of job security  or agreements  for advance 
warning  of future  layoffs. 
Some of the employers affected, such as automobile  and tire manu- 
facturers,  were particularly  hurt  by the poor economic performance  of 
their industries since 1979. Others, such as the newspapers  and meat 
packing  industries,  may have been victims of long-run  trends  that  were, 
at most, aggravated  by the weakness in the general  economy. In three 
cases, Chrysler  Corporation,  Consolidated  Rail Corporation  (Conrail), 
and the Chicago-Milwaukee  Railroad, the federal government was 
involved in imposing  the concessions. Competition  arising  from dereg- 
ulation  adversely affected employers  in the trucking  and airlines  indus- 
tries. And import  competition  has grown in several segments of manu- 
facturing. 
Along with the concessions there has been much talk about worker 
enlistment  by management  in improving  productivity,  worker partici- 
pation  in management,  and the quality  of working  life. For example, a 
union  representative  was placed on the board  of directors  of Chrysler; 
similar  moves were initiated  at American  Motors  Corporation  but were 
stymied  by antitrust  problems.  A peculiar  blend  of cooperative  rhetoric 
and  toughness  has emanated  from management.  Management  has been 
able to take a hard  line-  "take a cut or we close the plant." But there 
has also been discussion in industrial  relations  circles of the need to end 
the "adversary  relationship." 170  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Experience  has varied  when the issues of concessions have arisen.  In 
some cases workers vetoed concessions and were laid off. In other 
cases, the desires of local workers  were not honored  by national  unions 
concerned with maintaining  the integrity of industry-wide  contracts. 
And despite the concessions that did occur, there was a substantial 
increase  in unemployment  among  union  workers  after 1979. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in 1981 about 67,000 
workers  who negotiated  in 1981  received  first-year  wage cuts or freezes  . 
At the same  time,  roughly  160,000  apparel  workers  experienced  unsched- 
uled reopenings-justified on the grounds of unanticipated  inflation- 
that  led to extra  pay increases. The net effect of all these developments 
had  little overall  impact  during  1981  when the average  wage adjustment 
negotiated,  including  those for workers  experiencing  freezes and cuts, 
was more  than 10  percent.3 
1982 Concessions  in the Trucking and Automobile Industries 
Wage concessions in the intercity  trucking  industry  and at the Ford 
Motor Company and General Motors Corporation  in the automobile 
industry  have received by far the greatest amount  of public attention. 
Nominally, the new International  Brotherhood  of Teamsters'  National 
Master Freight Agreement covered about 300,000 workers, although 
large  layoffs in the trucking  industry  make the estimate uncertain.  The 
new 1982  contract  was officially  negotiated  early;  it was concluded  two 
months before the old contract would have expired on March 31. In 
principle,  the union  refused  to reopen  the previous  agreement,  but since 
the new one superseded  the old, the result  was equivalent  to a premature 
reopening.  The Teamsters'  concessions were negotiated  against  a back- 
ground of federal deregulation  of the trucking industry, a structural 
change that permitted  entry of nonunion  competition.  During  the final 
year of the old agreement  it was widely reported  that many trucking 
3.  Some  workers  experiencing  wage  cuts  or freezes  may  have  received  escalator 
payments;  such  payments  are not included  in Bureau of  Labor Statistics  estimates  of 
negotiated  adjustments.  Excluding  escalator  payments,  the average  first-year wage  ad- 
justment was  10.1 percent in 1981 for major contracts.  See "Major Collective  Bargaining 
Agreements  in the Private Sector,  1981," U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics News,  USDL 
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employers were paying less  than contractual wages with apparent 
acquiescence  from  local Teamsters  unions. 
Under the new agreement  no general wage increases are provided. 
The  escalator  clause is continued  at the previous  formula  of one cent for 
each increase of 0.3 point in the consumer price index. This formula 
provides  a little more  than  70 percent  protection  of the real  wage in early 
1982,  so that the contract  involves a real wage decrease. Moreover,  the 
frequency  of escalator  payments  is reduced  from semiannual  to annual 
and  provision  is made  for  diversion  of increases  arising  from  the  escalator 
to go into various  fringe  benefits. Such diversions, which are left to the 
discretion  of a labor-management  committee, could in theory eliminate 
all wage increases coming from the escalator, except for a specified 
component of the initial increment due on April 1, 1982. Work-rule 
restrictions  were relaxed  to permit  greater  employer  flexibility  in arrang- 
ing pickups and deliveries. In return  for these concessions, employers 
in the trucking  industry agreed not to operate nonunion subsidiaries. 
The new contract  expires March  31, 1985,  but contains a provision  for 
reopening  a year before expiration if the economic condition of the 
industry  substantially  improves  or deteriorates. 
The 1982 concessions in the automobile industry really had their 
beginning in  1979 when Chrysler found itself in serious economic 
difficulties.  Chrysler  was permitted  to deviate  from  the Ford  and  General 
Motors  contracts  signed  in the fall of 1979,  primarily  by delaying  certain 
wage adjustments  and reducing  pension contributions.  A second round 
of concessions was required  as the price for federal loan guarantees  in 
early  1980.  However, Chrysler  workers  received  a stock-ownership  plan 
under  the enabling  legislation.  Finally,  in  January  1981,  as the company's 
position continued to deteriorate, a third round of concessions froze 
wages and eliminated  past and future escalator adjustments.  A profit- 
sharing  plan  was established  in exchange  for  these concessions. Because 
Ford and General Motors continued to operate under the traditional 
escalator  formula  of 3 percent plus, a considerable  wage gap began to 
develop between Chrysler  and its major  competitors. By the time the 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) reached concession agreements 
with Ford and General Motors in early 1982, Chrysler's straight-time 
wage was probably 20 to 25 percent below the wage at the other 
companies. 
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layoff, were estimated to be covered by the "big three" concession 
agreements.  The Ford  and  General  Motors  settlements,  which  superseded 
the existing contract  and extended to September  1984,  eliminated  the 3 
percent annual  improvement  factor and froze wages by delaying  esca- 
lator payments. Both automobile agreements, following the Chrysler 
example,  included  profit-sharing  plans. And  both  addressed  job security 
concerns  of the  union  by  providing  certain  income  guarantees  for  workers 
with  seniority  and  various  assurances  with  regard  to future  plant  closings. 
Both  agreements  provide  for  early  reopening  in the event  that  automobile 
sales return  to the high  levels achieved in the late 1970s. 
Because their  escalator  is more  generous  than  the Teamsters'  formula 
(over 90 percent protection), and because the diversion of escalator 
money will be less  in the automobile industry than in the trucking 
industry, real wages will decline less for Ford and General Motors 
workers than for truckers. However, certain similarities  between the 
automobile and trucking concessions are noteworthy. First, in the 
absence  of declines  in the CPI,  both  concessions eliminate  the possibility 
of real  wage improvements.  Second, both attempt  to retain  the principle 
of escalation and of multiyear agreements. Third, both provide for 
reopening  if conditions  improve,  a signal  that  the concessions should  be 
regarded  as temporary,  even if the reopener  is not triggered. 
Some Historical Perspectives 
The concessions made by unions since 1979  are unusual  enough to 
attract  media  attention,  but  they are  by no means  unprecedented.  Groups 
of concessions, over a relatively  short  period,  have been known  to occur 
in the past. Obviously during the Great Depression wage cuts were 
common. It is more useful, however, to look to the post-World War  II 
period  since modern  institutions  of collective bargaining  had developed 
by that time. Two postwar episodes can be identified, one occurring 
right after the Korean War and the other in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.4 
4.  Information  on wage settlements  described  below in the text was drawn  from  such 
sources as Current Wage Developments,  Monthly Labor Review, and Daily Labor Report. 
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THE  POST-KOREAN  WAR  EPISODE 
Immediately  after the Korean War, union wages were cut in the 
garment  and textile industries.  These cuts occurred  during  a period of 
recession and slight  decreases in consumer  prices. Often  they were not 
readily  accepted  and  were preceded  by strikes  or  imposed  by arbitrators. 
Although  escalator  clauses  today  often  do not  provide  for  wage  decreases 
in response  to price decreases, some of those existing  in the early 1950s 
were symmetrical.  As a result, some unionized  workers  did experience 
reductions  in  that  part  of their  wage  arising  from  cost-of-living  allowances 
during  and  after  the Korean  War.  The  fact that  escalators  could  no longer 
be counted on to raise wages may have contributed  to their reduced 
popularity.  However, the common  practice  of separating  the basic wage 
and the cost-of-living allowance tended to cushion the psychological 
impact;  the official  wage was not cut, just the allowance. 
Other  developments  in the post-Korean War  period  are reminiscent 
of recent events. In some cases, notably at Studebaker  Corporation, 
workers  rejected  wage cuts negotiated  by their  unions. Sometimes  such 
rejections  were followed by plant  closings. In other cases, concessions 
were more artfully  packaged-as  at Kaiser-Willys  Incorporated-and 
were accepted. Although  there were often confrontations  over conces- 
sions, there were also instances of labor-management  cooperation. At 
times,  employees  purchased  stock  in  the  companies,  and  unions  provided 
financial  assistance. Unions and management  in distressed industries 
issued  common  appeals  for  governmental  regulations  that  would  increase 
employment. The frequency of strikes declined to a six-year low. In 
some instances unions permitted deviations from previous pattern- 
setting  arrangements  to accommodate  individual  employers. 
The 1953-54 recession also produced demands  for job-security ar- 
rangements. In some cases  unions were able to obtain only vague 
assurances  of continued  production.  At the major  automobile  firms  and 
in other industries more dramatic concessions were obtained from 
management.  For  many  years  there  had  been talk  of a guaranteed  annual 
wage for blue collar workers that would shield their incomes from the 
ups and down of production.  Proposals  for employment  guarantees  go 
back at least to the 1920s, and a scattering  of such plans existed before 
World  War  II. In 1955  a breakthrough  occurred  in automobiles  and  other 
industries  when the modern  supplemental  unemployment  benefits  plan 174  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
(SUB) was inaugurated.  The income guarantees  achieved during  the 
1982 concessions at Ford and General Motors are in effect "super- 
SUBs," which can be seen as extensions of these earlier  plans. 
THE  PERIOD  OF  "MANAGEMENT  HARDENING" 
Table 1 indicates  that the union-nonunion  wage differential  widened 
during 1953-58. But by the early 1960s there was talk in industrial 
relations  circles of a "hardening"  (taking  a "hard  line") on the manage- 
ment side. A prolonged  and  bitter  strike  occurred  in the steel industry  in 
1959. Steel management  conducted a major public relations program 
aimed at projecting  an image of itself as the victim of restrictive  work 
rules. A bitter strike also occurred in the late 1950s in the electrical 
equipment  industry.  Management  in the automobile  industry  began to 
increase  its interfirm  cooperation  during  negotiations.  In the newspaper 
publishing,  airline, and railroad  industries, "mutual  assistance pacts" 
and strike  insurance  plans were established  to provide  aid to employers 
on strike. These developments occurred against a background  of two 
recessions, one in 1957-58  and  one in 1960-61. 
Table 1 suggests that union and nonunion  pay rose at comparable 
rates  during  1958-64  in contrast  to the earlier  widening  of the wage gap. 
Wage reductions were rare in the early 1960s, but decisions not to 
increase  union  wages were quite  common.  More  than  27  percent  of union 
workers  in manufacturing  in 1962  received no general  increases of any 
type. Strike  frequency  declined. It might  be noted  that  it was in the early 
1960s  that econometric studies by Perry and others found evidence of 
below-normal  wage changes, especially in "visible" industries.5  These 
were interpreted  as indications  of success of the wage-price  guideposts 
program.  An alternative  explanation  could be that there was a manage- 
ment  hardening,  provoked  perhaps  by union  wage  gains  in the late 1950s, 
and that this trend  persisted into the 1960s. Or perhaps  the guideposts 
reinforced  management's  stance. 
In the case of steel, there is evidence of a traumatizing  effect of the 
1959  strike.  Labor  and  management  believed  that  the strike  had  induced 
5.  See George L. Perry, "Wages and the Guideposts,"  American Economic  Review, 
vol.  57 (September  1967), pp. 897-904.  For a review of such studies,  see John Sheahan, 
The Wage-Price  Guideposts  (Brookings  Institution,  1967), pp.  83-92.  The  estimate  of 
workers receiving no general increase is drawn from Ruth W. Benny, " Wage Developments 
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domestic steel consumers  to sample  foreign suppliers,  leading  to some 
permanent  loss of markets.  A considerable  effort  was made  at promoting 
labor-management  cooperation during  the early 1960s by both sides. 
Most notably, a human  relations  committee was established  that dealt 
with areas of mutual  concern and negotiated  a series of moderate  one- 
year agreements.  During  this period the escalator clause was dropped 
from  the steel wage agreement. 
Other instances of labor-management  cooperation  appeared  during 
the early 1960s,  notably  in West Coast longshoring,  and in Kaiser Steel 
Corporation  and Armour  and Company.  On the West Coast, the Inter- 
national  Longshoremen's  and Warehousemen's  Union and the Pacific 
Maritime  Association engaged in what was commonly referred  to as 
productivity  bargaining.  The resulting  "mechanization  and moderniza- 
tion" agreement,  which lasted into the 1970s,  provided  for acceptance 
by the union of various  changes  in work rules to permit  automation  and 
handling of containerized freight. In exchange, employers provided 
various benefits and job guarantees. The agreement, first reached in 
1960,  yielded large  increases in productivity  and  cost savings. 
The Kaiser "long-range  sharing  plan" arose out of the steel strike  in 
1959  after Kaiser broke with other steel firms  and reached a separate 
settlement  with the United Steelworkers.  A committee  was established 
to consider issues such as technical change, worker  displacement,  and 
other matters of concern to both parties. In late 1962 the committee 
announced  its new plan for workers  to receive a share of productivity 
gains, calculated  by a formula,  and various  employment  and retraining 
guarantees.  The Armour  Automation  Committee  was established  in the 
meat  packing  industry  in 1959.  The committee  provided  a forum  for the 
study of employment  problems  caused by plant closings and technical 
change and was credited with providing  retraining  and placement ser- 
vices for displaced  workers. Generally  there was much  talk and discus- 
sion in the early 1960s  about  automation,  structural  unemployment,  and 
related  issues. In some ways the concern about  automation  in the early 
1960s  can be compared  to the recent apprehension  about  plant  closings, 
"robotics," and keeping  pace with Japanese  technology. 
LESSONS  FROM  THE  PAST 
It is clear  that the current  atmosphere  of concessions has precedents 
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economic slack and a threat  to job security. A paradoxical  mixture  of 
management  aggressiveness  and experiments  in labor-management  co- 
operation  seems to develop in such periods.  But what  permanent  effects 
can be expected? 
The main  lesson from the two past episodes of union concessions is 
that  the dramatic  changes are largely  transitory.  For example, the shift 
to a one-year contract  cycle in the steel industry  and the abandonment 
of escalation lasted only a few years. Such a shift had the potential  of 
making  wages more sensitive to short-term  real economic fluctuations. 
It also carried  the risk of more frequent  exposure to strikes. In the era 
of cooperation  that existed in the early 1960s,  labor  and management  in 
the steel industry could live with this risk. Over time, however, the 
cooperative  spirit  eroded. The incumbent  president  of the Steelworkers 
was voted out partly on the grounds  that he had been too cooperative 
with management.  As cooperation  became less certain,  the logic of the 
multiyear  escalated  contract  reasserted  itself. In other  industries  similar 
developments  occurred.  The three pioneering  plans at Armour,  Kaiser 
Steel, and in West Coast longshoring  described  above ceased to exist. 
As employment expanded in the late 1960s, the sense of crisis that 
brought  those plans into existence evaporated. 
Wage Outcomes of the 1973-75 Recession 
Both the post-Korean War  period  and the period  from  the late 1950s 
to early 1960s  produced  concessions against  a background  of economic 
slack. But not all recessions have produced such dramatic  effects. In 
particular,  the severe recession that began in late 1973  did not produce 
concessions in the large  union settlements  that  receive prominent  press 
attention. The fact that concessions were not widely observed at that 
time  may  have contributed  to the impression  that  union  wages are  wholly 
insulated  from  market  pressures. 
It is argued  below that wage experience  of the major  union  contracts 
during  the 1973-75  recession is largely  explained  by accidents  of timing 
with regard  to expiration  and renegotiation  of long-term  contracts, the 
use of escalation  during  a period  of oil-shock  inflation,  and  the failure  of 
the 1973-75  recession to produce  widespread  threats  of permanent  job 
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beginning  in 1979  opened with certain similarities  to the 1973-75 expe- 
rience, the primary  difference  between the two periods  was the greater 
threat  to senior  workers  in the recent period. 
It should  be noted that  there were a few instances  of concessions and 
shifts in wage behavior  during  the 1973-75  recession and its aftermath. 
In the newspaper  industry  contracts  were reached  between printers  and 
owners  in New York  City and  Washington,  D.C., which  provided  for an 
end to restrictive  work rules in exchange  for "lifetime"  job guarantees 
and early retirement  bonuses. Similar  arrangements  were later worked 
out for commercial  printers. Union wage settlements in construction 
soared  after  federal  wage controls  were lifted  in early 1974,  but  scattered 
wage freezes,  wage reductions, and work-rule modifications were 
subsequently  reported.  Wage  reductions  were also reported  in the airline 
industry.  As in the current  period, management  was sometimes able to 
win concessions by tying  them  to the introduction  of profit  sharing. 
Probably  the most dramatic  shifts in the behavior of union wages 
came in the public sector. In the late 1960s  and early 1970s  a significant 
body of opinion held that the public could not "take" a strike of 
government  employees and that, therefore,  unions in the public sector 
could be expected to negotiate  exceptionally  large  wage settlements. In 
some government  sectors wages did rise more rapidly  than in private 
employment  during  the late 1960s.  However, by the mid-1970s,  the New 
York City fiscal crisis provoked a series of wage freezes and other 
concessions. It has been argued  that New York City's problems  had a 
demonstration  effect on wage settlements  in other  municipalities.6 
The general slump  in productivity  improvement  after 1973  also may 
have influenced  some major  contract settlements. It is true that union 
wages were more  insulated  from  the productivity  decline  than  nonunion 
wages. But there was some erosion in the wage increase  formula  of the 
"3 percent plus escalator" originally enshrined in the 1948 General 
Motors  contract.  Since  escalators  generally  provide  less than  100  percent 
protection  against inflation,  high rates of price increase erode the real 
value of the 3 percent factor. Beginning  in the automobile  industry  in 
1973,  and  then  in automotive  parts,  metals,  apparel,  and  other  industries, 
escalator  "diversions"  became  commonplace.  Typically  these consisted 
6.  For example,  see Harry C. Katz,  "Municipal Pay Determination: The Case of San 
Francisco," Industrial Relations,  vol.  18 (Winter 1979), pp. 55-56. 178  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
of putting  some part  of the wage increase specified  by the escalator  into 
the financing  of some benefit, often pension improvements.  In the 1979 
automobile settlements the 3 percent factor was further eroded by 
applying  it to the base wage excluding  the cost-of-living  allowance. 
It is  true, nonetheless, that during the  1973-75 recession wage 
concessions were less visible than has been the case recently. Table 3 
tracks  a selected group  of major  union  negotiations  during  1973-81.  The 
actual wage increases under settlements reached during 1973-78 are 
given. Thereafter, 10 percent price inflation  is assumed for estimating 
the increases achieved under escalated contracts. Settlements with 
relatively  low rates of increase  in 1973  (electrical,  petroleum,  tires, and 
trucking)  were negotiated during  the first half of the year. Although 
inflation  had  begun  accelerating  from  the low point  reached  in 1972,  the 
rate of inflation  that had been achieved earlier may have moderated 
these initial  settlements. In addition,  wage and price controls were still 
in effect. 
The larger settlements reached later in  1973 (meat packing and 
automobile  industries)  were concluded  in a period  when it was clear  that 
inflation  was accelerating  and wage-price  controls were being lifted. In 
1974,  inflation  as measured  by the CPI  reached  a then post-World  War 
II peak, and  wage-price  controls  were terminated.  The 1974  settlements 
reflect  these inflationary  pressures. 
It is evident from table 3 that the existence of an escalator clause in 
contracts negotiated in 1973-74 made a large difference in the wage 
increase  actually  received. The 1973  contracts  providing  the lowest rates 
of wage increase either had no escalator (petroleum  refining,  tires) or 
had escalators with "caps" that prevented inflation  above a specified 
level from influencing wage adjustments (electrical equipment and 
trucking).  In 1974  petroleum  proved  an exception to this generalization. 
Although  the nonescalated  contract  did not expire until 1975  and con- 
tained  no reopener  clause, the oil companies  agreed  to an unscheduled 
6 percent wage increase on top of what the contract specified for the 
second year. At the time, the substantial  boost in OPEC prices had 
dramatically  raised  oil industry  profits;  gasoline  shortages  had  occurred; 
and  the industry  was not in a position  to play  the hard-hearted  employer. 
The importance  of escalator  adjustments  to wages in the union  sector 
is clear  from  table  4. Since 1973  one-fifth  to one-third  of the annual  wage 
adjustment  experienced in the major  union sector (private  agreements C-1  3  oll  CN  all  C\  a\  C\  CN  ON  C\  U  CZ 
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Table 4.  Escalation  and Wage Increases in Major Unions, 1972-82a 
Percent 
Life-of-contract  annual 
wage  change  in major  Proportion 
Effective  hourly  contracts  expiring  of workets 
wage  change  in year shown  oveworkers  covered  by 
Proportion  Annual  escalators 
due to  change  in  at begin- 
escalator  Not  consumer  ning of 
Year  Total  provisions  Escalatedb  escalated  price  indexc  year 
1972  6.6  10.6  n.a.  n.a.  3.4  41 
1973  7.0  18.6  n.a.  n.a.  8.9  39 
1974  9.4  20.2  n.a.  n.a.  12.3  39 
1975  8.7  25.3  n.a.  n.a.  7.1  51 
1976  8.1  19.8  7.8  6.6  4.9  59 
1977  8.0  21.3  8.8  8.6  6.6  61 
1978  8.2  29.3  8.1  7.2  9.1  60 
1979  9.1  34.1  8.4  7.3  13.4  59 
1980  9.9  28.3  8.4  7.5  12.5  58 
1981  9.1  30.8  8.6  7.7  8.7  58 
1982  n.a.  n.a.  8.8  7.4  n.a.  57 
Sources:  Monthly Labor Revieiw, reviews  of bargaining calendar and deferred increases,  various  issues;  Cuirrenlt 
Wage Developments,  various issues. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Major private agreements. 
b.  Underestimated.  See  text for details. 
c.  CPI for urban wage earners and clerical  workers on a December  to December  basis. 
covering 1,000 or more workers) has come from escalators. This pro- 
portion  tends to rise and fall with the rate of CPI inflation  and with the 
percentage  of workers  covered by escalator clauses, a percentage  that 
increased  dramatically  during  the contract  negotiations  of 1974  and 1975. 
Beginning  in 1976  the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics has made available 
tabulations  of the wage increases experienced under expiring major 
union  agreements  by escalator  status.  The estimates  understate  the wage 
increases  experienced  under  escalated  contracts,  since  the  bureau  makes 
its calculations  just before the year of expiration  and does not impute 
further  CPI increases for that year. Nevertheless, table 4 indicates  that 
wage increases under escalated contracts have consistently outpaced 
those under  nonescalated  agreements  for contracts  expiring  in each year 
since 1976  and by a substantial  amount  in all years but one. During  this 
period  the ratio  of escalated  to nonescalated  wage rates appears  to have 
risen significantly. Daniel J. B. Mitchell  181 
Apart  from the effects of escalation, accidents  of timing  conditioned 
the outcomes of wage settlements beginning  in 1973. By the time the 
recession  of 1973-75  got under  way in November, all the 1973  contracts 
shown in table 3 were settled or largely  concluded. The only signs of a 
concession in the  1973 contracts were certain less favorable terms 
negotiated  for workers at the electrical equipment  division of General 
Motors  (Delco Electronics  and Frigidaire),  where  wages based on those 
in the automobile  industry  had reportedly  gotten out of line with those 
of competing  electrical  firms. 
Even in early 1974  there was still a good deal of uncertainty  about 
what  was happening  to the economy. The oil embargo  and  price  controls 
together  produced  gasoline  shortages  that  particularly  affected  industries 
such as automobiles  and mobile homes. Many observers confused the 
beginnings  of a recession with the transitory  effects of a gasoline supply 
problem. 
Steel was the only industry  that negotiated in 1974 and that might 
have been expected to be recession prone. Normally  the steel negotia- 
tions would have taken place over the summer  because the contracts 
expire on August 1. However, the parties  to the basic steel agreement, 
ever mindful  of the traumatic  steel strike  of 1959,  created  the experimen- 
tal  negotiating  agreement  (ENA)  in  March  1973.  ENA prohibited  national 
strikes  and created an arbitration  panel to make a binding  settlement  if 
the parties had not reached one of their own by April 15, 1974. A 
settlement  was reached privately  before the self-imposed  deadline. In 
exchange for its no-strike pledge, the union had received a guarantee 
that the 1974  agreement  would contain  at least an increase of 3 percent 
plus the escalator for each of the next three years. Thus the steel 
industry's  basic wage formula  for 1974  was locked in by early 1973. 
Table 5 shows the cyclical responses of output and employment  in 
the nine industries  whose contracts were reviewed in table 3. During 
1973-75, output and employment  declined sharply  in electrical equip- 
ment, automobiles, tires, trucking, and steel.  Employment in meat 
packing  declined slightly;  its figures  are distorted  by the meat shortage 
of 1973.  Output  declined  in petroleum  refining,  but the oil industry  was 
in no position to claim poverty, either in 1974 or 1975. Output and 
employment  in coal mining  increased  in response to the rise in energy 
prices.  Hence there  was no reason  to expect a restrained  wage settlement 
in that industry. Finally, although  employment  fell in telephone com- 182  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Table 5.  Change  in Output  and  Employment  of Production  and Nonsupervisory 
Workers,  Selected  Industries  and  Periods,  1973-80a 
Percent 
Industry and category  1973-75  1975-76  1975-79  1979-80 
Petroleum 
Output  -  3.4b  7.6  16.0  -  7.6 
Employment  2.3b  4.1  11.8  -  11.0 
Electrical equipment 
Output  -  18.6  15.6  50.2  -  1.3 
Employment  -  18.8  6.3  27.2  -  3.7 
Meat packing 
Output  5.Oc  7.9  2.8  3.7 
Employment  -  0.8c  3.0  8.5  -  0.2 
Automobile 
Output  -  24.8  27.6  42.4  -  25.3 
Employment  -  20.2  13.3  26.9  -  27.1 
Tire 
Output  -  16.4  0.7d  10.7e  -22.9 
Employment  -  6.5  -20.9d  1.9  -  7.6 
Trucking 
Output  -  19.4  15.6  36.9  -  18.0 
Employment  -  7.9  4.2  22.0  -  5.8 
Coal 
Output  8.0  3.2  19.9  8.0 
Employment  31.6  5.4  20.8  -  5.1 
Telephone 
Output  11.3  7.1  44.6  9.0 
Employment  -  3.9  -  1.6  4.4  0.8 
Steel 
Output  -21.9  9.5  18.2  -  18.4 
Employment  -  11.7  0.6  5.4  -  12.3 
Sources:  All output data except  that for the telephone  and trucking industries are from Siurvey  of Cuirrentt  Buisiniess, 
various issues;  telephone  output is from Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Productivity Measurses  for  Selected  Iniduistries, 
1954-79,  Bulletin 2093 (GPO,  1981), p.  183, updated by the BLS; employment  data are from BLS,  Emnployment  and 
Earninigs, various  issues,  and they  refer to the Standard Industrial Classification  codes  for the  industries  shown- 
291, 36, 201, 371, 301, 421-3,  12, 481, 331, respectively. 
a.  The Federal Reserve  Board indexes of industrial production are used as output measures for petroleum, electrical 
equipment,  automobile  (motor  vehicles  and parts),  steel  (iron and steel),  and coal  industries.  Output of  the  meat 
packing and tire industries  is  total  meat  and pneumatic  casings  (automotive)  production,  respectively.  Telephone 
and trucking output is measured by the index of output for telephone  communications  and by the index of output of 
common  carriers of general freight, respectively. 
b.  Influenced by oil embargo and shortages. 
c.  Influenced by meat shortage. 
d.  Influenced by strike. 
e.  The  1979 data omit the tire industry for motorcycles  and mobile homes,  producing an underestimate. Daniel J. B.  Mitchell  183 
munications,  output  rose, reflecting  strong  secular  productivity  perfor- 
mance. 
Thus  the story  of the impact  of the 1973-75  recession (or  lack  thereof) 
on major  union wage settlements  is partly  one of timing  and partly  the 
surge  in price  inflation  and  its wage impact  through  escalation.  Although 
employment  and  output  fell sharply  in many  industries,  most settlements 
came too early to be affected. Those that came later (coal, petroleum 
under the unscheduled 1974 reopener and in 1975, and the telephone 
industry)  were not hurt by the recession. However, even though the 
early contracts were "wrapped  up" before the recession began, why 
were these contracts  not reopened  in the face of the steep recession, as 
contracts  have been recently? 
There  is a long history  in labor  economics of attempts  to model  union 
wage setting. Many of these models basically picture the union as a 
labor-supplying  firm  that  faces a demand  curve (the derived  demand  for 
labor)  and  that  maximizes  some goal under  that  constraint.  Such  models 
are misleading  because they suggest  that  a "marginalist"  approach  well 
describes union behavior. The union is pictured as facing a wage- 
employment  trade-off  (the downward-sloping  demand  curve for labor) 
and as making  incremental  adjustments  to obtain the optimum  mix of 
the two "goods," wage rate  and  employment. 
An obvious issue raised by a marginalist  approach  is the degree to 
which a wage-employment  trade-off  exists, especially in the short run. 
If the elasticity of labor demand  is low, senior workers would have to 
sacrifice  a lot in wages to produce small gains in job security for their 
junior counterparts.  Estimates of elasticities of labor demand are not 
available, although some research suggests that unions face inelastic 
demand  curves. Examination  of the ratio  of labor  costs to total  costs can 
provide  an indication  of the degree  of demand  elasticity  ;7 such estimates 
are  provided  below for 1972,  the year preceding  the 1973-75  recession. 
7.  For evidence  on labor-demand elasticities  facing unions,  see Richard B. Freeman 
and James  L.  Medoff,  "Substitution  Between  Production  Labor  and Other Inputs  in 
Unionized and Non-Unionized  Manufacturing,"  Discussion  Paper 581 (Harvard Univer- 
sity, Institute of Economic  Research,  October 1977). Alfred Marshall pointed out that the 
elasticity of labor demand will tend to be low when the ratio of labor costs to total costs is 
low. This influence can be overcome  by substitution effects,  but such effects are ruled out 
by assumption in the text.  See  J. R. Hicks,  The Theory of  Wages,  2d ed.  (St.  Martin's 
Press, 1963), pp. 241-46. 184  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Conmpensation  of employees 
per dollar of output 
Industry  (percent)8 
Petroleum  7 
Electrical  equipment  46 
Meat  packing  11 
Automobile  25 
Tire  25 
Trucking  44 
Coal  mining  45 
Telephone  5  1 
Steel  33 
Assuming  no substitution  of other factors for labor  in the short run, 
and  assuming  labor  costs pass  through  to prices,  the  percentage  reduction 
in price that could result from a reduction  in labor costs is simply the 
ratio  of labor  costs to total cost multiplied  by the percentage  reduction 
in labor  cost. That is, a labor  cost ratio of 20 percent suggests that a 10 
percent wage cut could translate  into a 2 percent price reduction.  The 
output effect can be estimated as the product  elasticity of demand  for 
the employer's  output  multiplied  by the price reduction. 
The list above shows that the labor cost ratio was 33 percent or less 
in the steel, petroleum,  automobile,  meat packing, and tire industries. 
Relatively  high  ratios  appear  in the telephone  and  coal mining  industries, 
in which there was increased  output  during  the 1973-75 recession, and 
in trucking,  in which regulation  then held down nonunion  competition. 
Only  in electrical  equipment  was there  a relatively  high  ratio  (still below 
50 percent)  and no insulation  from recession. Generally  if unions were 
8.  For the electrical  equipment,  automobile,  and coal  mining industries  the figures 
shown are employee  compensation  per dollar of industry output (excluding intraindustry 
consumption) for input-output industries with SIC code numbers 53 through 58, 59, and 7, 
respectively.  The figure for trucking is compensation  per dollar of operating revenue for 
class  1 motor carriers. The telephone  estimate  refers to wages  and salaries of the Bell 
System  divided  by  operating  revenue;  this  ratio  was  then  multiplied  by  the  ratio  of 
compensation  to wages and salaries from the national income accounts for telephone and 
telegraph. For the petroleum,  meat packing, tire, and steel industries the ratio of payroll 
to shipments (for SIC codes 291, 301, and 331) was multiplied by the ratio of compensation 
to wage and salary for the corresponding two-digit industry in the national income accounts. 
To adjust for intraindustry shipments,  the ratio of such shipments to total industry output 
was  calculated  from the  1972 input-output  "use"  table for industries  with  SIC codes 
31.01,14.0101 through 14.0104, 32.01, and 37.0101 through 37.0105. Daniel J.  B. Mitchell  185 
sensitive to marginal  wage-employment  trade-offs, they might have 
found few gains at the margin from wage concessions due to low 
elasticities  in the demand  for labor. 
In  principle  unions  might  have raised  the effective elasticities  to unity 
by making  combination  deals involving  wage concessions and employ- 
ment guarantees. As  a first approximation,  an employer might be 
indifferent  between a 10  percent  layoff  and  a 10  percent  wage cut (below 
what  wages would otherwise  be). Either  adjustment  cuts payroll  by the 
same 10 percent. But even assuming  that a one-for-one  trade-off  could 
be obtained, it might  not be acceptable  to the union, given its political 
process. 
There is recent recognition  in the literature  on labor  economics that 
union  decisionmaking  responds  to senior  workers  who are  inframarginal 
with regard  to layoffs, largely due to the seniority systems that they 
themselves helped to  impose. Unless  the "median voter's" job  is 
threatened,  concessions would simply produce income reductions  for 
the majority  in exchange for extra employment  for the minority.  As is 
noted below, this political calculus might be altered by changing  the 
incentives  for gain-sharing  plans. But without  such incentives, majority 
altruism  is unlikely  to produce  wage flexibility. 
Thus unless there are imminent  threats  of bankruptcy  or permanent 
plant closings-crisis  situations that threaten senior workers-it  is 
unlikely  that  union  wage  behavior  will  be strongly  sensitive  to recessions. 
The 1973-75 recession created  job losses, but not a sense that those 
losses  would be permanent unless they were remedied by a wage 
concession. In 1973  the target  automobile  company  chosen by the UAW 
to set the wage pattern  for the "big three" was Chrysler.  Clearly  at that 
time the union did not perceive Chrysler  to be a marginal  firm  whose 
existence might  be threatened  by a strike, as was the case in 1979. 
Bargaining after the 1973-75 Recession 
The  trough  of the 1973-75  recession  was reached  in  early 1975.  Table  5 
shows that output rose during 1975-76 in all but one of the industries 
included in the table. Such output gains translated  into employment 
gains except in the telephone industry, in which the long-term  rate of 
rapid  productivity  improvement  continued, and in the tire industry,  in 186  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
which  a lengthy  strike  reduced  the annual  employment  totals. There  was 
every reason  for bargainers  to believe in 1976  and 1977  that  the employ- 
ment  outlook  was bright. 
Although  inflation  slowed markedly  in 1976, union negotiators  had 
recently weathered an extremely inflationary  period. Demands were 
made  in 1976  and 1977  for escalator  clauses when none existed and for 
the removal  of caps on escalators that had such provisions. Except for 
the petroleum  workers, who remained  on two-year contracts, the de- 
mands  were met. An escalator  was added  to the tire contracts  (see table 
3) and the cap was removed in trucking.  A cap was also removed in 
electrical equipment, although the new escalator was qualified  by a 
"corridor."9 Management at General Electric Company, the lead com- 
pany in the electrical negotiations, apparently decided in 1976 that 
improved  relations  with its unions  was a matter  of priority. 
Of the industries  in table 5, the only one in which an escalator was 
dropped  from  a contract  was coal mining.  The coal industry  has a history 
of difficult labor relations, and a prolonged strike ensued when its 
contract  expired in 1977, marked  by several tentative settlements and 
rejections  during  which the fate of the escalator  teetered  uncertainly.  In 
the eventual settlement in 1978, although  the escalator was removed, 
one component of the wage increase was labeled as cost-of-living 
adjustment. 
The climate  during  1976-79  generally  favored  an acceleration  of wage 
settlements.  Employment  was rising  and  price  inflation  was accelerating. 
In early 1978  the Carter  administration  proposed  a voluntary  price and 
wage deceleration program. The administration  also  became con- 
vinced-apparently erroneously-that an energy emergency  was being 
created by the coal strike and attempted to obtain a Taft-Hartley 
injunction.  When this attempt  failed, the public  perceived the adminis- 
tration  as having  been unable  to influence  a major  settlement, although 
technically  the 1978  settlement  did represent  a wage deceleration  from 
the previous  contract. 
9.  A corridor in an escalator clause is a provision that a certain amount of inflation will 
be ignored in calculating the adjustment.  In the case  of electrical  equipment,  a corridor 
added in 1976 provided that the escalator would reflect inflation up to 7 percent a year and 
above 9 percent a year with no credit for the interval between 7 and 9 percent. See Current 
Wage Developments,  vol. 28 (July 1976), p. 1. Daniel  J.  B. Mitchell  187 
The administration  subsequently  announced  a more  formal  program 
with  a 7 percent  guideline  for wage increases.  The evidence on the effect 
of this program  on aggregate  price and  wage indexes is mixed. It is even 
more  difficult  to judge its impact  on individual  contracts,  although  some 
agreements  were explicitly  tied to the guidelines.  There  did  appear  to be 
an initial  impact  on the petroleum  contracts  in early 1979.  Although  the 
first-year  adjustment  exceeded 7 percent, over the contracts'  two-year 
duration  the annual  increase  would have averaged  about  7 percent. The 
parties, however, inserted a reopener clause for the beginning  of the 
second year and raised  wages further  when the guidelines  were liberal- 
ized in 1980. 
Table  3 shows the  annual  rate  of wage  change  in  the  escalated  contracts 
for the period beginning  in 1979, assuming  a 10 percent annual  rate of 
CPI inflation.  Although  all settlements  exceeded the nominal  7 percent 
standard  (and the 7.5 to 9.5 percent standard  developed later for 1980 
contracts),  many  of the contracts  met the technical  requirements  of the 
guidelines. Under the guidelines program, escalated increases were 
calculated  prospectively  under  modest inflation  assumptions.  This pro- 
cedure  was initially  adopted  to encourage  escalation  at a time when the 
administration  anticipated  a slowdown in inflation.  In the case of the 
Teamsters'  contract,  the administration  also made  various  rule changes 
permitting  certain  components  of the settlement  to be excluded  from  the 
computation. In other cases such as in the automobile industry, the 
administration  found the settlement  to be acceptable  after  a stipulation 
from  the employer  not to pass the full cost into prices. 
To some extent the period beginning  in 1979 resembled the early 
phases of the 1973-75 episode. A second OPEC shock led to sharp  oil 
price increases. Oil price controls and turmoil in Iran combined to 
produce a gasoline shortage. This, then, turned American  consumers 
away from large domestically built cars, causing particular  distress in 
the automobile and tire industries. Initially damage was sectoral and 
might  well have been perceived  as a temporary  aberration. 
The tire contracts  expired  in April. By that  time there  had  been sharp 
increases in gasoline prices, which might have suggested tough times 
ahead  for the tire industry. If such a situation  was foreseen, however, 
its effect seemed  to be a weakening  of management.  In March,  Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Company announced that it would pull out of the 
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ing  from  strikes  and promised  the United Rubber  Workers  that  it would 
accept whatever  was negotiated  with the other companies  in return  for 
a no-strike  pledge. 
As in 1973,  the onset of recession came too late to influence  several 
of the 1979  settlements. Its major  impact  was seen in the Chrysler  case, 
but even the Chrysler  outcome was largely  dictated  by Congress,  as the 
price of loan guarantees,  and then by the loan authorities.  Two major 
contracts  in 1980  in  the telephone  and  steel  industries  show  little  evidence 
of the recession. In the case of the telephone industry, employment 
expanded  in 1979-80. The Communications  Workers,  the major  union 
in the industry,  noted at the time of the negotiations  that the economic 
outlook was "confused."10  The steel industry was again negotiating 
early under the ENA,  and the "3-percent-plus-escalator"  rule was 
already  embedded  in  that  arrangement.  In  fact, despite  ENA'  s guarantee, 
the basic wage increase was less than 3 percent, perhaps  a weak sign 
that the recession was having some impact. Finally, the  1981 coal 
settlement did show signs of  concern about job  opportunities and 
nonunion competition. The rank and file rejected an agreement that 
would  have removed  the "tax" imposed  on coal purchased  for resale  by 
operators-an  employer payment used to  finance benefits-on  the 
grounds  that this would stimulate  substitution  of nonunion  coal. As a 
result,  the tax remained  in the contract.  Internal  dissension  in the United 
Mine  Workers  of America  made  other  adaptations  unlikely. 
Although  the 1979  bargaining  round  initially  unfolded  similarly  to the 
1973 negotiations, it clearly ended on a different note. Three of the 
contracts shown in table 3 (for the automobile, trucking, and meat 
packing  industries)  did not survive until their official expiration  dates. 
In the tire  and steel industries  individual  companies  or plants  were given 
permission in midstream to deviate from the industry pattern. The 
difference  in  outcomes  between 1973-74  contracts  and  1979-80  contracts 
is attributable  to the differential  level of economic distress surrounding 
the two periods. The period  of economic slack that  began  in 1979  is still 
very much present in 1982. Senior union workers  in adversely affected 
industries  face severe threats  to  job security  in the form  of mass layoffs, 
plant closings, and potential bankruptcies. In contrast, the 1973-75 
10.  "Bargaining Resolution by CWA's Bell System Bargaining Council," Daily Labor 
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recession was sharp  but finite. As the contracts  negotiated  in 1973  and 
1974  moved toward  expiration,  there were clear signs of recovery. The 
same  could not be said for the contracts  negotiated  during  1979-80. 
Has a Turning Point Been Reached? 
The recent wave of wage concessions and early renegotiations  has 
led to predictions of a turning point in industrial  relations. As one 
observer  put  it,  ".  . .  we're  seeing  the  beginnings  of  a whole  new 
collective bargaining  process that should make many more companies 
ultimately  capable  of competing  in their  markets.  " 1 But  before  engaging 
in such speculation,  it is important  to consider  what might  be meant  by 
a turning  point. 
The  possibilities  can be discussed  with reference  to equation  1, which 
is representative  of a large  family of empirical  wage-change  equations 
that  have been estimated  during  the past two decades: 
(1)  w =  a  +  bU-1  +  cp +  dD,  +  eDf, 
where 
w =  the annual  rate  of wage change  in the union sector 
U-1  =  the inverse of the unemployment  rate (or some other pro- 
cyclical measure) 
p  =  the rate  of price inflation  (presumably  lagged) 
DC  =  a dummy  variable  equal  to 1  in the current  period 
Df =  a dummy  variable  equal  to 1 in some future  period. 
Significant  dummies  could indicate  what Perry  calls a norm  shift.  12 
Various  possible outcomes might  emerge  from the current  period  of 
wage concessions. It might  simply  be the case that  d <  0 and  e = 0, that 
is, wage change in the current  period  will be below expected levels. If 
this is the only effect, wage levels in the indefinite  future  will be lower, 
but  the process of the future  wage change will be indistinguishable  from 
previous  experience. On the other  hand,  it is also possible the d <  0 and 
1.  Allen  Sinai of Data Resources,  Inc.,  quoted in Tom Redburn, "Economists  See 
Recovery,  Then Tailspin,"  Los Angeles  Times, January 19, 1982. 
12.  George L. Perry, "Inflation in Theory and Practice,"  BPEA, 1980:1, pp. 207-41. 190  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
e >  0. Under such circumstances,  current  wage moderation  might  be 
wholly or partly transitory;  wage concessions today will be offset (or 
partially  offset) by catch-up  adjustments  in the future. Once the catch- 
up occurs, the basic wage-change  process remains  what it was in the 
past. Under both these outcomes, union wage change might well fall 
short  of nonunion  for a time-a  break  from  the past as shown in table 1. 
The pattern  of union contract concessions suggests that unions are 
hoping  for partial  recoupment  of current  concessions. Both the auto- 
mobile and trucking contracts contain reopeners based on industry 
conditions. A sharp improvement  in the condition of these industries 
could trigger  new negotiations and a union attempt to recoup earlier 
losses. The General  Motors and Ford contracts, moreover, have auto- 
matic (partial)  recoupment  provisions. Escalator  payments  are initially 
delayed, but are to be made up in the latter  part  of the agreement.  The 
loss of the 3 percent annual  improvement  factor is not recouped. Thus 
d <0; e > O, but - d > e. 
Situations  like those in the trucking  and  automobile  industries  suggest 
realignments  of the relative  wage structure,  not fundamental  changes  in 
wage determination  processes. A true "turning  point" in union wage 
determination  would be marked  by changes in the other coefficients of 
equation 1: a, b, and c. One such change, a fall in a, may have been 
taking  place beginning  in the mid-1970s.  As already  noted, the 3 percent 
real  improvement  factor began to erode during  that period  due to limits 
on escalator protection and other forms of creative accounting. The 
absence  of this  factor  from  the revised  automobile  and  trucking  contracts 
suggests  that previous  real wage improvements  are no longer  automati- 
cally expected. 
A  still more fundamental  change would be an increase in the b 
coefficient. A larger  b would imply that union wage settlements  would 
become more sensitive to real business cycle conditions. For such a 
change to occur, at least one of three behavioral  modifications  would 
have to take place. The parties could cease to negotiate long-term 
contracts  (or could  place frequent  reopeners  in long-term  contracts)  and 
thereafter  demonstrate  substantial  sensitivity in the resulting  contracts 
of short duration to real business conditions. Or the parties could 
negotiate  long-term  contracts  as they have in the past, but add to them 
contingency clauses sensitive to the business cycle. Thus a contract 
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sales, output, or productivity  (all cyclically sensitive)  just as escalator 
clauses have tied compensation  to movements in the CPI. Finally, the 
parties  could negotiate  long-term  contracts  as in the past, but correctly 
anticipate  swings in business cycles and build wage responsiveness to 
those changes  into the agreement. 
The impact of a behavioral change in the c coefficient is unclear. 
Theoretically  it is often argued  that the c coefficient should  be equal to 
1-that  is, that bargaining  should take place in real terms. However, it 
is in the long-term  escalated agreements  that the coefficient has come 
closest to equaling 1. If contracts  were to be shortened,  or if escalator 
clauses were to be dropped,  the c coefficient  might  fall below unity. If p 
is lagged, a drop in c would suggest reduced inflation  momentum;  last 
period's  inflation  would have a smaller  effect on current  inflation. 
There is reason to think that old tendencies in labor-management 
relations  were based on strong motivational  factors and that previous 
behavior  captured  by b and c tends to reassert itself in the absence of 
external intervention.  The existence of the long-term  contract is inti- 
mately  tied to strike  avoidance. In distressed  times, both parties  may  be 
especially concerned about the impact of strikes and may be able to 
work out cooperative relationships  without long-term  contracts. The 
procyclical  nature  of strike incidence has long been noted in the labor 
economics literature.  13  But ultimately  there  is no reason  to suppose that 
long-term,  inflation-sensitive  contracts  are a thing  of the past. 
To negotiate sensitive long-term  contracts, either  accurate  forecasts 
must be made of the future course of economic events or contingency 
clauses must be added. Previous experience suggests that the one 
contingency clause that regularly  has been built into contracts is the 
escalator. But contingencies  based on events other than inflation  have 
sometimes  been included  in contracts.  Some union  workers  are  covered 
by profit-sharing  or other gain-sharing  plans. Except in periods of 
concessions, unions have rarely  demanded  such plans, however. Apart 
from concessions, such plans were often established  before the union 
came on the scene. 
During  periods of distress, gain-sharing  arrangements,  which effec- 
tively raise the b coefficient, are sometimes put in place to  make 
13. Albert Rees,  "Industrial Conflict and Business  Fluctuations,"  Journal of Political 
Economy,  vol. 60 (October 1952), pp. 371-82. 192  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
concessions more palatable. For example, the 1982  Ford and General 
Motors  contracts  both contain  profit  sharing.  In such times, gain  sharing 
may  really  be loss sharing,  but coupled with the hope that if conditions 
improve  some recoupment  of the loss may be possible. Gain-sharing 
plans are typically geared to the employer's economic condition and 
thus  questions  can be raised  by the union  concerning  the accuracy  of the 
index  used. Such problems  do not arise with escalator  clauses because 
the CPI is published  by a neutral  government  agency. Thus with gain 
sharing  may come demands to open the employer's books to union 
scrutiny.  When employers are suffering  losses, they may be amenable 
to such demands;  in more  prosperous  periods  they may resist them. 
Gain  sharing  may be accompanying  demands  for union  participation 
in management.  Although the firm's fortunes may depend heavily on 
general business cycle conditions, there can be a wide diversity of 
interfirm  performance  related  to management  quality  and  foresight.  The 
historical record suggests that both cooperation between union and 
management  and gain sharing  are fostered during  periods of distress. 
But such arrangements  can erode when business improves. 
In short, the current  wave of wage concessions and renegotiations 
may well result in lower union wage levels-at  least for a time-than 
past  trends  would  have suggested.  There  may  well be a change  in the old 
3-percent-plus-escalator  formula  toward a more modest goal. Indeed, 
this  adaption  may have already  begun  in the 1970s.  A permanent  shift  to 
contracts  of short  duration  seems unlikely  as does a permanent  increase 
in sensitivity to business cycle conditions (an increase in b). These 
conclusions assume there is no external intervention  in the contract 
determination  process and might  be modified  if the government  did  take 
a role in reshaping  that  process. 
The Public Policy Question 
A key issue for public  policy is whether  there should  be some type of 
government  intervention.  In the recent past, intervention  in bargaining 
has meant controls and guidelines. While some might argue that such 
intervention  is still warranted-that government  should reinforce the 
downward  pressure  on wages with suggested  or mandatory  ceilings for 
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are  nil. Nor is it evident that  controls  and  guidelines  would  be desirable. 
But  there  have been suggestions  that  other  forms  of intervention  should 
be contemplated. 
Some observers have argued that long-term  union contracts have 
contributed to wage rigidity in the United States relative to other 
countries.  One  recent  proposal  has  called  for  a ban  on long-term  contracts 
and  escalator  clauses.  14 In terms of equation 1, such a proposal  aims to 
raise the b coefficient. This would mean that wage inflation  would be 
more  responsive  to economic slack, thus  raising  the efficiency  of demand 
restraint  as an anti-inflationary  device. However, a ban on long-term 
contracts would increase the frequency of negotiations  and therefore 
the risk of strikes. Moreover, it is not clear how such a ban would be 
enforced. Even if long-term  contracts were made legally nonbinding, 
parties would still be free to maintain  a "gentlemen's agreement." 
Union  contracts  were not made  legally  enforceable  in  federal  courts  until 
the Taft-Hartley  Act of 1947  and their status in state courts before that 
date  was ambiguous  in manyjurisdictions.  Contracts  were  made  enforce- 
able  largely  at the behest of management  groups  who wanted  guaranteed 
periods  of extended peace with labor. Yet the parties  generally  lived up 
to their  agreements  before the Taft-Hartley  Act. 
It might  be possible to reinforce  the tendency toward  profit  and gain 
sharing  that has accompanied  wage concessions. Currently  profit-shar- 
ing plans enjoy tax advantages  if their bonuses are used for retirement 
or other  deferred  purposes.  If policymakers  wanted  to raise  the sensitiv- 
ity of wage change to business cycle conditions, broader  tax incentives 
could be created to encourage  gain-sharing  arrangements.  Such policy 
changes have worked in the past. For example, before World War II 
unions  often opposed  benefits  such as employer-paid  pensions. But they 
responded  enthusiastically  to the post-World  War  II tax incentives for 
pensions, life insurance,  and  health  and  welfare  plans. 
Apart  from tax incentives, government  agencies such as the Federal 
Mediation  and  Conciliation  Service could  play  a role  in  fostering  interest 
in gain-sharing  plans. During World War lI the National War Labor 
14.  Barry Bosworth,  "Policy  Choices for Controlling Inflation," in Controlling Infla- 
tion: Studies  in  WagelPrice  Policy,  Alternatives  for the  1980's,  1 (Washington,  D.C.: 
Center for Democratic  Policy,  1981), pp.  16-22.  See also Robert J. Gordon,  "Why U.S. 
Wage and Employment Behavior Differs from That in Britain and Japan," Working Paper 
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Board  played  such  an  educational  role  with  regard  to various  contractual 
arrangements  like grievance arbitration.  At present a combination  of 
economic distress and concern about productivity and international 
competition  has created a greater receptivity toward "new" ideas in 
labor-management  relations. Ideas potentially linked to gain sharing, 
such as how to meet the Japanese  challenge- "theory Z"  -the  quality 
of work  life, worker  participation  in management,  and codetermination 
are currently  under  debate.  '5 
The receptive climate for such experiments  is fragile. If conditions 
improve, management  loses interest. But deteriorating  conditions can 
have the same effect on the union side. In the early 1930s  union  interest 
in labor-management  cooperative  experiments  established  in the 1920s 
quickly  diminished  in the face of growing  worker  anger  and  militancy.  16 
Thus federal reinforcement  of plans for gain sharing  may be crucial to 
their success. The Reagan administration  has taken the position that 
there should be no intervention in the wage decisions of financially 
distressed industries  or any others. Hence it is reasonable to assume 
that  institutional  changes in wage determination  will not be deliberately 
encouraged  in the near  future. 
Possible Spillovers from Concessions 
An  important  issue in  assessing  short-term  prospects  for  wage  inflation 
is the degree to which the wage concessions in the distressed  unionized 
industries  will spill  over into  other  wage  decisions. Unionized  employees 
account  for only about  one-fourth  of all wage and salary  earners.  But to 
the  extent that  there  is substantial  spillover  from  union  wage  concessions 
to wages elsewhere, the effectiveness of monetary  restraint  in inducing 
disinflation  will be enhanced. 
Two kinds  of spillover  can be considered.  First, will there  be substan- 
tial spillover into areas of the union sector that are not facing severe 
threats  of bankruptcy  and  permanent  plant  closings?  The answer  for any 
15. Theory Z is described in William Ouchi, Theory Z: How American Business  Can 
Meet the Japanese  Challenge (Addison-Wesley,  1981). 
16.  Sanford Jacoby,  "Union-Management  Cooperation: An Historical Perspective," 
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particular  unionized  unit  will probably  turn  out to depend  heavily on the 
extent of pattern  following in the past. Spheres of union wage setting 
have been evident for many years. For example, wage settlements in 
automotive  parts, truck manufacturing,  and farm equipment  have tra- 
ditionally  been patterned  after the automobile  settlements  in the major 
firms.  The basic wage settlements  in the steel industry  have been linked 
to settlements  in smaller  steel companies,  nonferrous  metals, and metal 
containers. Intercity trucking settlements have an influence on local 
trucking  negotiations  and on the settlements  for truckers  in retail  food 
stores. 
The key settlements  are not imitated  exactly in any of these pattern- 
following situations. There may be variations in fringe benefits, the 
timing  of wage adjustments,  the precise formula  used for the escalator, 
and  in "noneconomic"  areas such as work rules. In periods  of distress, 
pattern  following  shows some tendency  to erode. Thus  when traditional 
spheres  of imitation  exist, current  contract  concessions in the key units 
may be expected to lead both to more diversity  in the wage settlements 
within  the sphere  and to some spillover  from  the key settlements  to the 
followers. 
Union settlements  outside  the spheres  of the distressed  industries  are 
likely to be reduced in 1982 relative to 1981, but largely because of 
reduced  inflationary  pressures  generally.  Developments  in the oil indus- 
try  illustrates  this trend.  As shown  in table  3, the 1980  settlements  called 
for an annual  rate  of wage increase  of 10.5  percent  a year  over two years 
with no escalator. The two-year oil contracts signed in early 1982  call 
for about 8 percent a year with an increase of 9 percent  during  the first 
year. 
The second possibility  of spillover  is to wages in the nonunion  sector. 
This possibility is especially important  since about three-fourths  of the 
paid work force is unorganized.  There have been attempts  to estimate 
econometrically  the degree  of spillover  from  union  to nonunion  and  from 
nonunion  to union  by introducing  into  a wage-change  equation  a variable 
measuring  the union-nonunion  wage differential.  A negative  and signif- 
icant  coefficient  for this variable  in the union  equation  might  be taken  to 
indicate  nonunion-to-union  spillover. A positive and significant  coeffi- 
cient in the nonunion  equation  might suggest spillover in the opposite 
direction. 
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nonunion-to-union  spillovers but none running  in the opposite direc- 
tion.17 However, there are three problems  with their interpretation  of 
the statistical  record. First, the results are not robust. Susan Vroman 
and  I have shown  that  a change  in the data  source  can  reverse  the results. 
Second, it is easy to show that  relative  wage coefficients  in wage-change 
equations  can represent  a form of "regression  to the mean.""8  If union 
and  nonunion  wage  adjustments  are  determined  by the same  independent 
variables  but do not interact, the relative  wage variable  is essentially a 
proxy  for aberrant  behavior  in the past. By definition,  aberrant  behavior 
is eventually  corrected, thus giving  the relative  wage coefficient  signifi- 
cance and the expected sign. Third,  other evidence suggests that non- 
union  pay is influenced  by union  wage developments. 
There have been periodic  case studies of nonunion  firms  that follow 
union pay patterns  as a matter  of policy. It is known that union wage 
concessions have already spilled over into nonunion  decisions in the 
firms given the concessions. For example, during 1979-81, nonunion 
Chrysler  workers  were affected  by the union  wage  freeze. Firms  seeking 
wage concessions from  unions  are  expected to have their  executives and 
other  nonunion  personnel  share  in the sacrifice. 
Some direct  evidence exists concerning  nonunion  wage-setting  prac- 
tices. The Bureau  of National  Affairs  (BNA) polls personnel  executives, 
private  and public, concerning  various aspects of their wage and other 
policies.  19  BNA found that the use of surveys of wages external  to the 
employer  was almost universal  (93 percent), at least among  firms  large 
enough to enter the BNA sample in 1979-80. Of those employers that 
used wage surveys, 85 percent indicated  that the resulting  information 
was  "very helpful" to  "essential" in making wage decisions. The 
opinions expressed by large and small firms  were quite similar.  To the 
17.  George  E.  Johnson,  "The  Determination  of Wages in the Union and Nonunion 
Sectors,"  British Journal  of Industrial Relations,  vol.  15 (July  1977), pp.  211-25;  and 
Robert  J.  Flanagan,  "Wage  Interdependence  in  Unionized  Labor  Markets,"  BPEA, 
1976:3, pp. 635-73. 
18.  SusanVroman,  "Union/Non-unionSpillovers,"  andDanielJ.  B. Mitchell, "Union/ 
Nonunion Spillovers: A Note, " British Journal of Industrial Relations,  vol. 18 (November 
1980), pp. 369-76;  Daniel J. B.  Mitchell,  "How  to Find Wage Spillovers  (Where None 
Exist): A Note of Caution," Industrial Relations,  forthcoming. 
19.  Bureau of National  Affairs,  Inc.  Wage and Salary Administration,  PPF Survey 
131 (Washington,  D.C.:  BNA,  1981), p. 3; Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,  Policies for 
Unorganized Employees,  PPF Survey  125 (BNA,  1979), p. 13. Daniel  J.  B. Mitchell  197 
extent that  union  wages are included  in wage surveys  taken  by nonunion 
employers, some spillover is likely. In addition, certain public and 
government-funded  private  employers  are legally  required  to follow the 
results  of pay surveys that  may be influenced  by union  wages. 
Twenty-two percent of employers in the BNA survey in 1977-78 
reported  that they have a standard  policy for their  nonunion  employees 
of matching or exceeding the wage settlements they reach for their 
unionized  workers. Sixty-three  percent  indicated  that  they "reviewed" 
the relation  between  union  and  nonunion  pay within  their  organizations, 
although 69 percent responded that they had no formal policy for 
adjusting  nonunion  wages based  on their  union  settlements.  Large  firms, 
which contain a disproportionate  fraction of the work force, seemed 
more likely to be influenced  by union pay outcomes within their firms 
than  small  ones. 
The limited evidence available suggests that union contract  conces- 
sions will have a significant  impact  on the pay of nonunion  workers in 
the enterprise receiving the concession. To some extent, nonunion 
employers will be influenced  by union wage concessions-and  union 
settlements  generally-through their survey methodology.  Purely  non- 
union employers, however, are less likely to be influenced  by union 
concessions than  those that  are partially  unionized. 
Although  the current  rash  of union  wage concessions has past prece- 
dents, it is still an unusual episode. Thus there is danger in simply 
extrapolating  from previous behavior established during "normal" 
periods. Perry  has offered  a model in which wage-adjustment  "norms" 
develop in the labor market, and these may be influenced  by special 
events or unusual economic developments.20  Because of  the wide 
publicity  given to recent union wage concessions in major  industries,  it 
is possible  to argue  that  wage  norms  will shift  in  response.  Unfortunately, 
reverse arguments  are also easy to concoct. It could be argued  that the 
concessions have been reported as unusual responses to exceptional 
circumstances  and thus will not be seen as guides  outside the distressed 
industries.  Because the concept of norms  is elusive, norm  shifts cannot 
be readily  predicted  in advance. 
Nonunion  pay is rarely  determined  by explicit contract. However, it 
has become recognized in the economics literature  that contract-like 
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regularities  may exist in the nonunion sector. Some authors attribute 
these implicit  contracts to turnover  costs or to differential  risk prefer- 
ences between  employers  and  employees. In addition,  there  is historical 
evidence that  the threat  of unionization  played  a role in encouraging  the 
centralization  and  bureaucratization  of the personnel  function  in modern 
corporations.21  More  recently  these tendencies  have been reinforced  by 
various  regulatory  policies in the labor market-most  notably require- 
ments for equal employment opportunity-which  have injected the 
courts into personnel  matters  and added  pressure  for central  control of 
personnel  decisions. Finally,  courts  have begun  to suggest  that  nonunion 
workers  may be entitled  to forms  of "due process" previously  required 
only in union  contracts. 
Thus, while nonunion  pay may be more market-sensitive  than  union 
pay, contract-like  regularities  associated with bureaucratic  decision- 
making  can be expected to create some inflation  momentum  in wage 
setting.  A survey of pay decisions planned  for 1982  for salaried  workers 
(largely nonunion) as  of  summer 1981 indicated that raises in the 
9 percent  range  were being budgeted.  By early 1982,  however, surveys 
suggested that planned increases had been revised to the 8 percent 
range.22  This rate of increase is comparable  to the annualized wage 
change negotiated in the oil settlement of January 1982 in the union 
sector. It is obviously easier to alter  a proposed  nonunion  budget  than  a 
legally  enforceable  contract.  But some inertia  in nonunion  pay decisions 
should be expected. Given the increases in social security taxes and 
continuing  pressures of inflation  on fringe-benefit  costs in health care, 
forecasters  in late 1981  and  early 1982  were reluctant  to project  increases 
in compensation  per hour  of substantially  less than  8 percent  for 1982.23 
21.  Arthur M. Okun, Prices  and Quantities: A Macroeconomic  Analysis  (Brookings 
Institution,  1981), chaps.  2 and 3; Martin Neil  Baily,  "Wages  and Employment  under 
Uncertain  Demand,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  vol.  41 (January 1974), pp.  37-50; 
Robert E. Hall and David M. Lillien,  "Efficient  Wage Bargains under Uncertain Supply 
and Demand,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  69 (December  1979), pp. 868-79;  and 
Sanford Jacoby,  "The  'Human  Factor':  An  Historical  Perspective  on  Internal Labor 
Markets  in  American  Manufacturing  Firms,"  Working  Paper 21  (UCLA  Institute  of 
Industrial Relations,  1980). 
22.  American  Compensation  Association,  1981-1982  Salary Budget  Survey (Scotts- 
dale,  Ariz.:  ACA,  1981),  p.  1; and  "Survey  Finds  Companies  Scaling  Back  Earlier 
Anticipated 1982 Salary Gains,"  Daily Labor Report, March 29, 1982, p. A3. 
23.  The December  1981 UCLA business forecast estimate for increases in compensa- 
tion  per hour in  1982 was  8.1  percent  calculated  year  to  year  and 7.5  percent  when Daniel  J.  B.  Mitchell  199 
The  wage concessions themselves  will have only a limited  effect since 
the number  of workers directly covered by concessions was probably 
less than two million. Even if it is assumed that these workers receive 
no wage increases in 1982 (an exaggeration  because some concession 
contracts  provide for increases) and that spillovers  double the number 
of workers  affected, the impact  on overall  wage adjustments  is small. If 
four  million  workers  were to receive no increases  while others received 
an average  8 percent, the average  adjustment  would  be reduced  to about 
7.6 percent. 
Obviously  it is possible that  compensation  per hour  will rise by much 
less than  the 8 percent  forecast for 1982.  However, if that occurs it will 
either  be because price inflation  turned  out to be substantially  less than 
that forecast or because a substantial  break from past wage behavior 
occurred-a  norm shift. It can be said that there was no evidence of a 
sharp  break  from  past behavior  in the union  sector during  1981  and  early 
1982.  Table  6 presents  the results  of a survey by the Bureau  of National 
Affairs,  of median  first-year  union  wage adjustments  from 1978  through 
the first quarter  of 1982.  These figures  are distorted  by the exclusion of 
escalator  payments  from  the settlement  estimates.  More  important,  they 
are not a good measure  of average  wage changes  because they represent 
median settlements, regardless  of the number  of workers covered by 
each settlement. But they do indicate how individual  decisionmakers 
and  bargainers  were responding  to economic developments. 
Median wage settlements in manufacturing  began to run at a flat 9 
percent  in 1980.  The 1981  quarterly  figures  and the estimates  for 1982:1 
show no deviation from this pattern. Figures for nonmanufacturing 
excluding  construction  are  more  erratic  but  averaged  9.5 percent  in 1980 
and 1981.  The drop  in the first  quarter  of 1982  in these adjustments  may 
reflect the direct inclusion of  settlements linked to the Teamsters' 
intercity  trucking  concession, which  was negotiated  in late January,  and 
to airline wage concessions; through  January 1982  the figure was 9.5 
calculated fourth quarter to fourth quarter. The Data Resources,  Incorporated, forecast 
for the same figures as of January 1982 was 8.5 and 8.7 percent, respectively.  The January 
1982 forecast of Goldman Sachs and Company for compensation  per hour was 9.4 and 9.3 
percent. See UCLA Business  Forecasting Project, The UCLA NationalBusiness  Forecast 
(December  1981), table 1; Data Resources,  Inc.,  The Data Resources  Review, of the U.S. 
Economy  (January 1982), p.  1.8; Goldman Sachs and Co.,  Economic  Research  (January 
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Table 6.  Union  Wage  Decisions:  First-Year  Median  Wage  Settlements,  1978-82a 
Percent increase 
Nonmanu- 
Year  facturing, 
or  Manl-  exclluding 
quarter  facturing  construction  Construction 
1978  8.5  7.5  6.2 
1979  8.3  8.5  8.5 
1980  9.0  9.5  11.3 
1981  9.0  9.5  11.8 
1981:1  9.0  9.8  n.a. 
1981:2  9.0  9.0  11.6 
1981:3  9.0  9.2  11.8 
1981:4  9.0  9.6  n.a. 
1982:1  9.0  8.3  n.a. 
Sources:  Daily Labor Report,  April 2,  1982, p. Bl;  Daily Labor Report,  January 22, 1982, pp. BI,  B2; and Bureau 
of National Affairs,  Inc.,  1981 and 1980 Briefing Sessions  on Collective  Bartgaining (Washington,  D.C.:  BNA,  1981, 
1980), p.  1 of both editions. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  The data exclude  escalator  payments  and are not weighted  by number of workers covered  by each  settlement. 
"First year"  is  defined  as  first ten  months  of  contract.  The  survey  includes  settlements  involving  fifty or  more 
workers. 
percent.  Construction  settlements  are too seasonal to appear  except in 
the second and  third  quarters;  but  on an annual  basis, construction  wage 
agreements  showed an accelerating  rate of wage adjustments  during 
1978-81. 
The imperturbability  of the figures is remarkable  in view of the 
accelerating  pace of contract  concessions beginning  in 1979.  In particu- 
lar, during  the fourth  quarter  of 1981  and first quarter  of 1982  both the 
Teamsters  and the UAW underwent  a well-publicized  period of soul- 
searching  about reopening  their contracts and finally  agreed to do so. 
Apparently  negotiators  outside traditional  spheres  of wage imitation  of 
these unions  were not impressed. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Several lessons can be drawn about the recent rash of union wage 
concessions. First, similar  episodes of concessions have occurred  in the 
past, which suggest that permanent  and fundamental  changes in the 
processes of union wage determination  are unlikely to result from the Daniel J.  B. Mitchell  201 
current  concessions. Most important,  the permanent  abandonment  of 
the long-term  contract and the cost-of-living  escalator is not likely to 
occur. The paper suggests that if it is socially desirable to introduce 
greater  wage sensitivity to the business cycle into labor contracts, tax 
and  other  incentives to gain sharing  should  be considered. 
Second, the history  of union  negotiations  in the mid-1970s  shows the 
importance  of long-term  contracts and their timing  in determining  the 
response of union wages to recession. Although  the 1973-75  recession 
was severe, the major  contracts had been essentially locked in during 
1973 before the recession was apparent. The effect of timing can be 
overwhelmed,  as the reopenings  of contracts  negotiated  during  1979-80 
clearly  demonstrate.  However, major  concessions were possible in the 
period  beginning  in 1979  only because aggregate  demand  restraint  and 
other, competitive, developments stemming  from imports  and deregu- 
lation  pushed  industries  to the point that  permanent  job losses to senior 
union  workers  were threatened.  Pressure  for concessions was magnified 
by the steady widening  of the union-nonunion  wage differential  that  had 
occurred  during  the 1970s. 
Third,  by themselves the concessions will have only a small  effect on 
movements  in aggregate  wages in 1982,  since a relatively  small  fraction 
of the work  force is directly  involved. Forecasters  in  early 1982  expected 
increases in compensation  per hour of about 8 percent for the year. A 
substantial  reduction  below that level could result from either a decel- 
eration  of price inflation  that is sharper  than expected or from  a shift in 
wage norms. During  the early part of 1982, however, pay settlements 
for union workers outside the distressed industries showed little evi- 
dence of such a shift. Discussion 
ALBERT REES suggested  that  the paper  should  have given more  emphasis 
to two noncyclical factors in interpreting  the recent round  of contract 
concessions. The first  is deregulation,  which has put direct  pressure  on 
both  the trucking  and  airline  industries.  The second is the secular  rise in 
foreign competition, which has directly and indirectly threatened  the 
steel, automobile,  durable  goods, and other industries.  James Duesen- 
berry recalled John Dunlop's analysis of wage reductions  in the early 
1930s, which showed that product market  pressure, rather than high 
unemployment  per se, was most closely associated with wage declines. 
Wages fell earliest and fastest in sectors in which product market 
problems  were most acute, rather  than  in sectors that  had  generally  high 
unemployment  rates. 
A major  focus of the discussion  was on the magnitude  and  significance 
of growing wage differentials between unionized and nonunionized 
workers.  Martin  Baily  noted  that,  if an  earlier  historical  relation  between 
union  and nonunion  wage levels was to be restored,  either  union  wages 
must slow or nonunion wages accelerate. The former appears to be 
occurring,  but if this represents  a restoration  of a previous  equilibrium, 
there is little likelihood of spillover that would generate comparable 
moderation in nonunion wages.  Michael Wachter agreed with this 
analysis. He noted that union wages have typically risen relative to 
nonunion  wages during  economic downturns  and  fallen  relatively  during 
expansions. But the 1970s were an exception to this pattern, in large 
measure  because  union  wages were  indexed  to the consumer  price  index, 
which rose rapidly  over the decade. The current  recession seems to be 
restoring  the historical  relation  of wages  primarily  by reductions  in union 
wages. Duesenberry  disagreed  with  Wachter's  cyclical  analysis  of union- 
nonunion  wage differentials  and  argued  that  there  has been a secular  rise 
in the differential  since the depression, with breaks  in this pattern  only 
during  the Second World  War  and the Korean  and Vietnam  wars. This 
means there is no "historical" relation between union and nonunion 
wages to which to return. Jeffrey Sachs noted that the growth in the 
union-nonunion  differential  has been an international  phenomenon  over 
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the past seven years. He attributed  this trend  to the oil price shocks and 
the  productivity  slowdown,  both  of which  shrank  the scope for  real  wage 
increases. These shocks were rapidly translated  into lower wages in 
more  competitive  markets  for labor,  but not in the unionized  sector. 
John Taylor argued that two types of concessions considered by 
Mitchell  were  quite  different  in  their  economic  implications.  First,  unions 
negotiating  a regularly  scheduled  wage contract  may grant  concessions 
in the form  of lower than  expected wage increases. Second, unions  may 
agree to unscheduled  reopenings  of contracts  in order  to grant  conces- 
sions. Only the latter type of concession reduces the rigidity of the 
current  wage-setting  process, and it is this rigidity  that makes inflation 
so sticky. George Perry observed that Taylor's distinction was less 
important  in a more general  view of what caused inflation  inertia.  Even 
at normal  reopening  periods, settlements  could be influenced  by a range 
of developments  and expectations. If these settlements  now turn  out to 
be unexpectedly  moderate,  it could help the whole disinflation  process 
by influencing  wage setting  elsewhere. Alan Blinder  wondered  whether 
changes in the fraction of workers covered by escalator clauses are a 
barometer  of wage developments  generally. Mitchell  said that changes 
in that fraction mainly reflect changes in the relative importance of 
industries  in which escalators are already  prevalent.  Rees added  that it 
is more common to make various kinds of adjustments  to escalators 
rather  than  simply  to abandon  them. Recently  the frequency  of escalator 
adjustments  has been reduced in some contracts. Mitchell noted that 
when concessions are made, unions have generally deferred COLA 
adjustments  that are otherwise due while preserving  the COLA provi- 
sion for the future. 
Several participants  commented on the possibility that the current 
round of union concessions presaged a rapid deceleration in average 
wage inflation.  Duesenberry  noted that the rate of growth in average 
hourly  earnings  dropped  sharply  between fall 1981  and spring  1982.  On 
the other hand, Mitchell  reported  that surveys of firms'  intended  wage 
increases were only 1 to 2 percentage  points lower in March  than they 
had  been in September.  Wachter  suggested  that the major  union "give- 
backs"  did not provide  much  inducement  for nonunion  workers  to make 
similar  concessions because nonunion  workers  had  not shared  in above- 
normal  wage increases in the 1970s. On the basis of recent experience, 
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old level, it might  have a growing  impact  on wage deceleration,  perhaps 
because the median union worker becomes personally threatened  by 
unemployment.  Martin  Feldstein added  that it might  not be the level of 
unemployment  as much  as the expected duration  of high  unemployment 
that  is having  the deflationary  effect. 